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Abstract
This paper analyzes asymmetrically informed litigants' incentives to settle when
they anticipate the possibility of appeals. It identies a strategic eect, which
induces a litigant to negotiate pretrial so as to optimize her posttrial bargaining
position, and an information eect, which means that litigants will take into account
pretrial how the information revealed by the trial court's verdict will translate into
posttrial equilibrium payos. The paper's main contribution is twofold: First, it
establishes a workhorse model of settlement and litigation in the shadow of appeals
which may be used in future research to analyze specic issues of litigation and
legal reform. Second, the importance of including the possibility of appeals in the
litigation model is highlighted by an example in which some results contradict the
immediate intuition: It is shown that (i) more accurate trial courts may actually
attract less cases and (ii) cases may go to trial court with a larger ex-ante probability
for higher legal costs in the appeals stage.
JEL Classication: K41; K13; D82
1 Introduction
Litigants often settle out of court in order to save on legal costs. However, informational
asymmetries may result in a breakdown of settlement negotiations: If a litigant has
private information which makes her condent to have a strong case, she will only settle
out of court if this yields her a high payo, whereas a lower payo is required if she is
I am grateful for discussions with and suggestions by Eberhard Feess, Daniel Goller, Michael Hewer,
Thomas Kittsteiner, Elisabeth Schulte, Urs Schweizer, Petros Sekeris and participants of the research
seminar in Aachen and of the annual meetings of Verein fur Socialpolitik, Association Francaise de
Science Economique and the German Law & Economics Association.
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pessimistic regarding the strength of her case. Hence, the opposing party may nd it
worthwhile not to settle if that litigant is optimistic in order to be able to settle at more
favorable terms with a less condent litigant.1
This basic tradeo exists at any stage of a legal dispute. However, the terms at which
litigants negotiate for out-of-court settlement will change in the course of the litigation
process: Information revealed in court may remove the informational asymmetry to pave
the way for agreement, which some litigants reach as late as while the jury comes back
to the courtroom to announce its verdict. Similarly, litigants may use the very fact that
the opposing party rejected previous settlement oers to update their assessment of the
strength of their case.
Of course, rational litigants will take into account these changes in the bargaining
environment when making decisions at earlier stages. In general, the better informed
litigant will avoid to settle early if, given his private information, he anticipates his
bargaining position to improve over time. Furthermore, the less informed litigant will seek
to settle early with the opposing party if the latter appears to have observed information
which makes him unprotable to negotiate with at later stages.
This is the rst paper to analyze how anticipating future stages of appeal and set-
tlement negotiation inuences litigants' decisions at earlier stages of the legal process.
In particular, a model is considered in which a plainti may make a take-it-or-leave-it
settlement demand to a privately informed defendant. If the defendant rejects, the case
goes to trial court. If appeal is led for the trial court's verdict, the plainti may make
another take-it-or-leave-it settlement demand, the rejection of which will bring the case
to the appeals court, which is assumed to be the nal stage of the litigation process.
Two main eects are identied which drive litigants' decisions in equilibrium: First,
the plainti will anticipate that her posttrial equilibrium payo will depend on the pri-
vate information that a defendant who has rejected the pretrial settlement demand may
have. When choosing the pretrial settlement demand, the plainti will therefore take
into account for which private information the defendant will reject or accept it, and how
this aects posttrial payos. In other words, the plainti will choose the pretrial settle-
ment demand so as to optimize the strategic environment in which posttrial settlement
negotiations take place. I shall label this eect the 'strategic eect'.
For instance, if the trial court's decision is purely random, it depends on the ex-ante
probability distribution of which private information the defendant observes whether the
equilibrium probability that settlement ever occurs with two levels of jurisdiction is higher
or lower than with just one level. Specically, the threshold private information beyond
which a defendant will refuse to settle both pretrial and posttrial is shifted towards lower
1See Bebchuk (1984), Nalebu (1987) and the literature following these papers.
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densities of this distribution: A lower density of the marginal 'type' of defendant implies
that the plainti has a lower marginal benet of settling with a higher probability, which
induces her to make a higher posttrial settlement demand.
The second eect is that reducing the probability of settlement by making a tougher
pretrial settlement demand will improve the plainti's average case that actually goes to
trial and thus increase the plainti's probability of winning in trial. Hence, the plainti
will prefer a higher pretrial settlement demand if the dierence in her equilibrium payo
after winning and losing in trial court is higher. In other words, litigants will take into
account pretrial how the information revealed by the trial court's verdict will translate
into posttrial equilibrium payos. Hence, this eect will be referred to as the 'information
eect'. A typical feature of the information eect is that the plainti's basic cost-benet
tradeo in posttrial settlement negotiation is less sensitive to the settlement demand if
she has lost in trial court. Hence, parameter changes that increase the plainti's posttrial
payos will reduce the dierence in her posttrial payos after winning and losing in trial
court and, therefore, increase the plainti's incentives to settle pretrial.
If the information eect dominates, it will thus result in counter-intuitive comparative
statics. For instance, in the example discussed in Subsection 6.2, higher legal costs in
the appeals stage will increase the ex-ante probability that a case goes to trial court in
equilibrium. Furthermore, a trial court that predicts the appeal court's eventual judgment
more accurately may be used with lower probability, as the defendant anticipates to earn
a lower information rent posttrial and will, thus, tend to accept higher pretrial settlement
demands.
The existing economic literature on appeals has mainly focused on how the possibility
of an appeal aects judges' incentives, especially when they have career concerns.2 The
basic idea of this literature is that judges, and decision makers in general, prefer their
decisions not to be reversed by an appeals instance. Hence, in Shavell (2006, 2007) and
Iossa and Palumbo (2007) the threat of appeals serves as a disciplining device prevent-
ing opportunistic judges from deviating too much from the socially preferred outcome.3
Daughety and Reinganum (2000) and Levy (2005) analyze Bayesian updating of imper-
fectly informed judges which seek to avoid reversal of their judgment in the rst, and to
impress an imperfectly informed expert in the second paper.
2Notable exceptions are Shavell (1995, 2010), in which social costs and benets of having more or less
levels of jurisdiction, of the accuracy of these levels and of discretionary review versus direct appeals are
analyzed. Butler and Hauser (2000) analyze settlement incentives of symmetrically informed litigants
under the specic rules of the WTO dispute settlement system.
3In a similar vein, Spitzer and Talley (2000) analyze a game of judicial review when judges at both
levels care about the distance of the nal decision from their personal political position and about legal
cost.
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While none of these papers consider settlement incentives of asymmetrically informed
litigants, I take a dierent approach by focusing on exactly this aspect and treating courts
as stochastic dummy players. As a consequence, litigants in my model only care about
how the appeals court will eventually judge, and the information that the trial court's
verdict and the better informed litigant's actions reveal regarding this issue.
Another line of related literature deals with settlement in dynamic contexts. Robson
and Skaperdas (2008) discuss the case of litigants ghting over an initially undened prop-
erty right. Since information is symmetric in that paper, the two main eects identied
in the present paper cannot occur. However, posttrial bargaining will occur in equilib-
rium although the trial court denes binding property rights, because either litigant's
individually most preferred choice of how to use the property is dierent than the joint
surplus maximizing choice, whereas in my paper litigants just bargain for a joint-welfare
neutral transfer. Although conned to pretrial settlement, Spier (1992) is closely related
to the present paper as she also allows for multiple rounds of negotiation between asym-
metrically informed litigants. Indeed, her two-period case with c > 0 is equivalent to the
analysis of the purely strategic eect in Section 5 of this paper. However, as the focus of
her paper is on the timing of settlement when there are multiple stages, she connes that
basic analysis of the two-period case to deriving the result that there will be settlement
with some positive probability in each period. By contrast, my focus is on the impact of
the second stage and, in the more general part of the paper, of the information revealed
by the trial court's verdict on the ex-ante settlement probability.
Last, the signalling argument that a privately informed player may delay a mutually
benecial agreement in the hope for an even better oer is well-known from the literature
on sequential bargaining with asymmetric information. While incentives for delaying
agreement are wiped out as oers can be made more frequently,4 delay does occur in
equilibrium whenever the time between oers is substantial, as it is the case in the
present paper. For instance, Hart (1989) shows in such a setting the intuitively plausible
result that higher cost of delay increase incentives to agree early. The present paper's
contribution to this literature is to introduce the possibility that players observe an
informative public signal between the rounds of negotiation, and to show that the well-
known relationship between cost of delay and timing of agreement may reverse in such a
model.
The remainder of the paper will be organized as follows: The timing and payos
in the model will be presented in Section 2. Section 3 discusses assumptions regarding
the stochastic relationship among the defendant's private information and the trial and
appeals courts' verdicts in detail. Section 4 consists of a general analysis of the sub-
4See, for instance, Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986)
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game after the plainti has made her pretrial settlement demand. When analyzing the
full game, I will rst discuss in Section 5 the case in which the trial court's verdict is
completely unrelated to how the appeals court will eventually judge, which allows me
to isolate the pure strategic eect. Section 6 then deals with strictly informative trial
courts. After presenting some general results, I will consider a specic class of signal
technologies, which allows me to derive clear-cut comparative static results. Section 7
concludes and discusses qualications and potential extensions of the model.
2 The Model
Consider a case in which a plainti sues a defendant for damages of an undisputed size
D.5 After ling suit, the plainti may make a take-it-or-leave-it settlement demand
ST , which I will refer to as pretrial settlement demand. The defendant then observes
some private information x which allows him to update the probability that the appeals
court will eventually judge in favor of the plainti, and chooses whether to accept the
demand. To be more specic on the informational structure, let us assume that the
private signal x is distributed with a full-range distribution function F (x) with density
f(x) and monotonically increasing hazard rate f(x)
1 F (x) .
If the defendant accepts the pretrial settlement demand, he pays ST to the plainti,
and the game ends. If the defendant rejects the settlement demand, the case goes to trial
court, which imposes litigation costs cpT on the plainti and c
d
T on the defendant.
6 The
trial court awards damages equal to D or zero. Let lT 2 f0; 1g denote the trial court's
decision, where lT = 1 means that damages D are awarded.
The defendant decides whether to appeal. If he does not appeal, the plainti may
appeal.7 If any of the litigants has appealed, the plainti may make another settlement
demand SA, which I refer to as posttrial settlement demand, and which the defendant
may accept or reject. If he rejects, the case goes to the appeals court, which imposes
additional litigation costs cpA on the plainti and c
d
A on the defendant. The damages
awarded by the appeals court, if any, are again D.
5For instance, in an accident case, the size of the victim's harm and the injurer's negligence may
be undisputed, and the case is about nding out whether the plainti's negligence was causal for the
accident.
6In reality, the plainti may choose whether to indeed go to trial or to back down if her demand has
been rejected. This raises credibility issues of settlement demands discussed in Nalebu (1987), which
are known to result in an upper bound to settlement demands. In order to avoid the case distinctions
associated with the possible boundary solutions, we make this simplifying assumption.
7Note that this timing of the right to appeal is wlog, as it will turn out that the losing party will le
appeal anyway.
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How the appeals court will eventually judge is unknown to litigants, but the defen-
dant's private information and the trial court's decision are potentially informative signals
thereon. I will explain the specic assumptions on the litigants' prior information and
the signal technology in Section 3. Summing up, the timing of the game is as follows:
(i) Plainti makes a settlement demand ST .
(ii) Defendant privately observes x and decides whether to accept or reject the demand.
(iii) If the defendant has rejected the demand, the case goes to the trial court, and the
trial court's verdict lT 2 f0; 1g is announced.
(iv) Defendant may appeal.
(v) If defendant has not appealed, Plainti may appeal.
(vi) Upon appeal, plainti may make posttrial settlement demand SA.
(vii) Defendant decides whether to accept the demand.
(viii) If the defendant has rejected the demand, the case goes to the appeals court, and
the appeals court's verdict lA 2 f0; 1g is announced.
The equilibrium concept used throughout is perfect Bayesian, and I will focus on pure-
strategy equilibria. More specically, note that the game has a proper subgame beginning
after the plainti has made the pretrial settlement demand ST . For every given ST , we
can characterize pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria of the subsequent subgame by
means of (i) the set of realizations of x for which the defendant rejects ST , (ii) both
litigants' appeals decisions should they have lost in trial court, (iii) the plainti's beliefs
on what the defendant has observed given the trial court verdict lT , (iv) the plainti's
posttrial settlement demand SrA given the trial court's verdict lT = r, r = 0; 1, and (v)
the set of realizations of x for which the defendant rejects SrA(ST ), r = 0; 1. Anticipating
that such a perfect Bayesian equilibrium will be played in the subsequent subgame, the
plainti will then choose ST so as to maximize her expected payo.
The model set out here is an extension of the standard (one-stage) litigation model, in
which an unsettled case goes directly to the nal instance, adding steps (iii)-(vii) to that
model. Hence, it may be useful to recapitulate the result of the standard model, which is
presented without proof. To this end, denote by cp (cd) the plainti's (defendant's) costs
of litigating at the single court.8
8Note that in the original version of this proposition, Bebchuk (1984) makes some additional assump-
tions to rule out the boundary solution x = 0.
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Proposition 1 (Bebchuk (1984)) Consider a litigation model with just one round of
litigation, which consists of steps (i)-(ii) and (viii) of the game set out above. This version
of the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, in which the case goes to court if
and only if the defendant observes some x < x implicitly given by
D =
f(x)
1  F (x)(c
p + cd) (1)
if D  f(0)
1 F (0)(c
p + cd), and x = 0 otherwise.
The intuitive trade-o that the plainti faces when making a settlement demand is
that reducing the set of types of defendant with which a settlement is reached increases
the amount at which the case is settled but comes at additional expected litigation costs
represented by the right-hand side of (1). Note that the assumption of an increasing
hazard rate f(x)
1 F (x) is sucient to guarantee uniqueness of the interior equilibrium given
by (1).
3 The Signal Technology
In this section, I will be more specic about how the trial and the appeals courts' outcomes
and the defendant's private signal x are related to each other. Let the set of all states of
nature be partitioned into two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive events lA which
refer to the appeals court's eventual judgement: In the event denoted by lA = 1 (lA = 0),
the appeals court will deterministically judge in favor of the plainti (defendant). The
state of nature is unknown to litigants, who just know , the unconditional ex-ante
probability of event lA = 1.
Two noisy signals on the state of nature may be observed in the course of the game:
First, after the plainti has submitted her pretrial settlement demand, the defendant
privately observes a real number x 2 [0; 1] as a noisy signal on the true state of nature.
Let the informativeness of this signal be such that, conditional on the signal x being
observed, the defendant can update the probability that the true state of nature is in event
lA = 1 from  to x.
9 Assuming that the ex-ante probability that the defendant observes
signal x is distributed continuously on [0; 1] with density f(), consistency requires that
 =
R 1
0
xf(x)dx.
Second, the trial court's verdict lT 2 f0; 1g is a noisy public signal on the state of
nature and, therefore, on how likely each event lA is. In order to be able to analyze
litigants' Bayesian updating after observing lT , I need to dene its accuracy in predicting
9For convenience, I will sometimes refer to a defendant who has observed the private signal x as a
'type-x defendant'.
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lA. As I want to accommodate the case in which the two signals are correlated even
conditional on the event lA in which the true state of nature is, the notation must allow
for the public signal's accuracy to be a function of x, and to vary across events lA. In
particular, let the accuracy of the public signal when the defendant's private signal is x
and the true state of the world is in event lA = r be pr(x). That is to say, if lA = r, the
probability that the trial court's verdict correctly anticipates the appeals court's when
the defendant has observed x is pr(x). In order to rule out trivial signal technologies,
assume that for all r and x, 0 < pr(x) < 1.
This informational structure implies litigants' posterior beliefs upon observing the
signals: Recall that the plainti's ex-ante beliefs for the distribution of the defendant's
private signal x has density f(). After observing the public signal, she may update
the density of the defendant's types, as the public signal may be correlated with the
defendant's private signal. In particular, her updated belief on the defendant's private
signal when observing the public signal lT = r have density yr(x)f(x), where
yr(x) := Prob(lT = r j x) (2)
denotes the overall (i.e., unconditional on lA) probability of a public signal (trial court
verdict) lT = r given the defendant's private information x. Using Bayes' rule, we get
y1(x) = p1(x)x+ (1  p0(x))(1  x) (3)
y0(x) = p0(x)(1  x) + (1  p1(x))x = 1  y1(x): (4)
The defendant may also use the observed public signal to update his beliefs on the
probabilities of events lA. In particular, let
zr(x) := Prob(lA = 1 j x; lT = r) (5)
denote the probability of the true state of nature being in event lA = 1 conditional on the
realizations of the private signal x and the public signal lT = r. Then zr(x) is a type-x
defendant's posterior of lA = 1 after observing lT = r. Using Bayes' rule, we can express
zr() in terms of the accuracy pr():
z1(x) =
Prob(lA = 1 ^ lT = 1 j x)
Prob(lT = 1 j x) =
p1(x)x
p1(x)x+ (1  p0(x))(1  x) (6)
z0(x) =
Prob(lA = 1 ^ lT = 0 j x)
Prob(lT = 0 j x) =
(1  p1(x))x
p0(x)(1  x) + (1  p1(x))x: (7)
Having dened a signal technology in a most general way, I shall now restrict generality
in two respects: First, for simplicity, I will focus on signal technologies with continuous
and dierentiable functions pr(), which implies that yr() and zr() are also continuous
and dierentiable. Second, the following plausible properties of the signal technology are
assumed:
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Assumption 1 (a) y1() non-decreasing: Defendants who observed lower x are no
more likely to win in the trial court than those who observed higher x.
(b) zr() strictly increasing, r = 0; 1: Given any verdict of the trial court, defendants
who observed higher x are strictly more likely to win in the appeals court than those
who observed lower x.
(c) 8x : p1(x) + p0(x)  1: This assumption is equivalent to z0(x)  z1(x) for all x,
which means that given the defendant's private signal, the public signal is infor-
mative in the sense that a defendant who has lost in trial court can never expect to
be more likely to win in the appeals court than if he had won in trial court.
The signal technologies that satisfy Assumption 1 include a number of prominent
special cases some of which I will now briey discuss by formalizing the public signal's
accuracy and then using (3), (4), (6) and (7) to derive parties' posterior beliefs. The most
common case in the literature on aggregating informative signals, such as Ottaviani and
Srensen (2001) or Gerardi and Yariv (2008), is that the signals are drawn independently.
In this case, the public signal's accuracy neither depends on the defendant's private signal
x nor on the true event lA = r:
Example 1 (Independent Signals) If signals are drawn independently, then p1(x) =
p0(x) =  >
1
2
, which is some constant. It follows that
y1(x) = x+ (1  )(1  x)
y0(x) = (1  x) + (1  )x
z1(x) =
x
x+ (1  )(1  x)
z0(x) =
(1  )x
(1  x) + (1  )x:
From the plainti's perspective, the public signal lT = 1 may be true, which occurs
with ex-ante probability x, or false, which occurs with probability (1   )(1   x). The
defendant updates his private information by dividing the probability that the public
signal lT = 1 is true by the total ex-ante probability of the signal lT = 1.
A polar case is that the trial court just rolls dice, i.e. where its verdict does not
contain any information on the true state of nature. This implies that any signal lT = r
is sent with some constant probability which is neither related to the defendant's private
signal nor the event lA in which the true state of nature is.
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Example 2 (Uninformative Public Signal) If the public signal is completely unin-
formative, then p1(x) = 1  p0(x) = , which is some constant. It follows that
y1(x) = 
y0(x) = 1  
z1(x) = x = z0(x):
As the probability that a particular public signal lT = r is sent neither depends on the
true event lA nor on the defendant's private information x, no party can use the signal
to update information.
A third example is a case which I will refer to as the public signal being based on the
private signal but otherwise random, that is to say, the trial court judges with exactly
those probabilities given by the defendant's private signal, but completely randomizes
given these probabilities. In this example, the defendant cannot infer any new information
from the public signal, but, subject to this restriction, the public signal is as informative
as possible for the plainti. This is the case whenever the public signal lT = 1 is sent
with probability x independent of the true event lA.
Example 3 (Randomizing Based on Private Signal) If the public signal is randomly
drawn on the basis of the defendant's private signal, then p1(x) = 1 p0(x) = x. It follows
that
y1(x) = x
y0(x) = 1  x
z1(x) = x = z0(x):
Just like in the case of the completely uninformative public signal, the probability of
each signal lT does not depend on the true event, i.e. p1(x) = 1   p0(x). Hence, the
defendant's posterior beliefs on the probability distribution of the events lA is the same
as before observing the public signal. However, as the trial court sends the public signal
with the correct probabilities privately known by the defendant, the plainti can update
her beliefs on the defendant's private information. In particular, the posterior density
function with which the plainti believes the defendant's types to be distributed after
observing the public signal lT = r is yr(x)f(x), which is clearly dierent from her ex-ante
beliefs f(x).
4 General Analysis
As the game has a proper subgame starting after the pretrial settlement demand ST
has been made, I will analyze the game using backward induction. Hence, most of the
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following analysis will be performed for some given ST . Let us start with the plainti's
choice of posttrial settlement demand SA after a pretrial settlement demand ST has
been made by the plainti and rejected by the defendant, the trial court has made a
verdict lT = r, r = 0; 1, and appeal has been led. The plainti believes that the
defendant's private information is distributed on [0; 1] with some density r(x) with
support Mr  [0; 1]. Furthermore, the defendant may have used the trial court's verdict
to update his private information x, so that he expects to be held liable by the appeals
court with probability zr(x).
The concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium then requires that, given these updated
expectations, players maximize their payos. Hence, the analysis of the posttrial set-
tlement negotiations is similar to the standard screening model of litigation: If a type-x
defendant rejects the settlement demand, his expected payo is  zr(x)D cdT  cdA, which
is strictly decreasing in x, whereas accepting a posttrial settlement demand SA gives him
 SA  cdT , which is constant in x. Hence, if any type of defendant accepts the settlement
demand, it is someone who has observed a high probability x of losing in the appeals court.
The plainti anticipates the defendant's optimal strategy when choosing her posttrial set-
tlement demand. The following Lemma states that in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium
and for each outcome r of the trial, there exists a type of defendant xrA, r = 0; 1, who is
indierent between accepting and rejecting the equilibrium posttrial settlement demand,
and whose equilibrium strategy has been to reject the pretrial demand ST .
Lemma 1 In any pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the plainti's posttrial set-
tlement demand after a trial court's verdict lT = r, r = 0; 1 is S
r
A = zr(x
r
A)D + c
d
A with
xrA < supMr and
xrA 2 arg max
xA2Mr
Z
Mr\[0;xA]
(zr(x)D   cpA)r(x)dx+ (zr(xA)D + cdA)
Z
Mr\[xA;1]
r(x)dx: (8)
Proof. As zr() are strictly increasing in x due to Assumption 1, there exists, for every
SA and r, a unique ~x
r
A(SA) such that SA = zr(~x
r
A(SA))D+c
d
A. Suppose that this ~x
r
A(SA) 62
Mr, and dene M
acc
r (SA) := fx 2 Mr : x > ~xrA(SA)g the set of all private signals x such
that a defendant who has observed x appears in the posttrial settlement negotiation stage
with positive probability in equilibrium and accepts the posttrial settlement oer SA.
IfMaccr (SA) 6= ;, then S 0A = zr(infMaccr (SA))D+cdA yields the plainti a strictly higher
expected payo than SA, as it will be accepted with the same probability and S
0
A > SA.
If, on the other hand, Maccr (SA) = ;, this means that SA will be rejected with probability
1. Then there exists a suciently small " > 0 such that [supMr   "; supMr)  Mr and
S 00A = zr(supMr   ")D+ cdA yields the plainti a strictly higher expected payo than SA.
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The plainti's expected payo with this S 00A isZ
Mr
(zr(x)D   cpA)r(x)dx+
Z supMr
supMr "
[cdA + c
p
A   (zr(x)  zr(supMr   "))D]r(x)dx;
whereas her payo with a never-accepted settlement demand is just the rst summand
thereof,
R
Mr
(zr(x)D   cpA)r(x)dx. Note that this also proves xrA < supMr.
Lemma 1 greatly simplies the subsequent analysis by allowing to transform the
plainti's problem of optimizing the posttrial settlement demand into one of optimizing
the marginal type of defendant who will reject or accept the posttrial settlement demand,
just like the literature on the single-stage model usually proceeds. However, that this is
possible in this model is not trivial, as there may be density holes in the plainti's beliefs,
i.e. the support of the plainti's beliefs Mr may not be an interval. Furthermore, Lemma
1 proves that it cannot be optimal for the plainti to make a settlement demand that is
rejected with certainty: Making a settlement demand that will be accepted only just by
the highest type of defendant from the set Mr yields the plainti a settlement payment
that is only marginally smaller than what expected damages from these types would have
been, whereas the litigation cost savings are substantial.
This latter implication of Lemma 1, that it is optimal for the plainti to settle with
some types of defendant posttrial, also implies that the highest types of defendant which
the plainti believes to be facing always pay less than what they expect to pay after a
verdict by the appeals court. To be more specic, given a trial court's verdict lT = r, all
types x  xrA have exactly the same payo in the posttrial stage. The next Lemma shows
that this property implies that a losing defendant always les appeal: If the plainti
believes that some type x  xrA of defendant has led appeal, she must do so for all types
of defendant who had turned down the pretrial settlement demand.
The following Lemma shows that this is true also for a losing plainti, although this
latter result is an artefact of the simplifying assumption that the case directly proceeds
to court after the defendant has rejected a settlement demand (which means that the
settlement demand is always credible): The plainti always prefers to le appeal and
then appropriate the defendant's cost savings in the settlement.
Lemma 2 In any pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the litigant who has lost in
trial les appeal.
Proof. Suppose that lT = 1. Without appeal the defendant's payo is  D   cdT
with certainty. With Lemma 1, the defendant's expected payo from ling appeal is
 z1(minfx; x1Ag)D   cdA   cdT . Hence, the defendant les appeal if and only if
z1(minfx; x1Ag)D + cdA  D: (9)
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In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which, in the posttrial settlement negotiation, the
plainti believes that the defendant has observed x 2M1, consistency of beliefs requires
that condition (9) is satised for all x 2 M1. Furthermore, with Lemma 1, x1A 2 M1.
Hence, all x 2 [0; 1] satisfy (9).
Suppose now that lT = 0. If appeal is not led, the plainti's payo is  cpT with
certainty. Upon ling appeal, she can always secure herself a payo cdA   cpT by setting
xA = infM0. Hence, ling appeal must be optimal also under the optimal posttrial
settlement strategy.
An immediate implication of Lemma 2 is that the plainti's equilibrium beliefs when
her settlement demand is due do not depend on the trial court's outcome, i.e. M0 = M1 =:
M . Hence, when restricting attention to pure-strategy equilibria, consistent beliefs on x
have density
r(x) :=
yr(x)f(x)R
x02M yr(x
0)f(x0)dx0
(10)
if x 2M .
Consider now a defendant's decision of whether to accept the plainti's pretrial settle-
ment demand ST . In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the defendant will take the plainti's
equilibrium beliefs with density () and the resulting equilibrium posttrial settlement
demands SrA as given. Recall from Lemma 1 that the posttrial settlement demands S
r
A
can be expressed in terms of the marginal types of defendant xrA accepting this demand.
Hence, every pure-strategy Bayesian equilibrium of the subgame following a pretrial set-
tlement demand ST can be completely characterized by the triple (x
0
A; x
1
A;M).
More specically, recall that the defendant anticipates pretrial to be held liable in
trial court with probability y1(x). Hence, dening
S(x) :=
X
r
yr(x)zr (minfx; xrAg) ; (11)
the defendant's expected payo when going to trial is
d(x) =  S(x)D   cdA   cdT : (12)
The defendant will reject the pretrial settlement demand ST if and only if  ST < d(x).
The plainti's beliefs are consistent if and only if M = fx :  ST < d(x)g. Furthermore,
Lemma 1 requires that x0A; x
1
A 2 M . These observations imply that any pure-strategy
perfect Bayesian equilibrium must take one of the three forms set out in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2 Consider the subgame after the plainti has made a settlement demand
ST . In any pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium one of the following statements is
true:
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(i) z0(x
0
A) < z1(x
1
A) and there is some xT > maxfx0A; x1Ag such that the defendant
rejects ST if and only if x  xT .
(ii) z0(x
0
A) = z1(x
1
A), S(x
0
A)D + c
d
A + c
d
T  ST and [0; x0A] M .
(iii) z0(x
0
A) > z1(x
1
A), [0; x
1
A] M and [x0A; 1] M .
Proof. Using (4), (6) and (7), we can write (11) as
S(x) =
8>>>><>>>>:
x; if x  minfx0A; x1Ag;
(1  y1(x))z0(x0A) + y1(x)z1(x); if x0A < x < x1A;
(1  y1(x))z0(x) + y1(x)z1(x1A); if x1A < x < x0A;
z0(x
0
A) + y1(x)(z1(x
1
A)  z0(x0A)); if x  maxfx0A; x1Ag.
(13)
Part (i): If z0(x
0
A) < z1(x
1
A), then S() is strictly increasing in x: This is obvious for the
rst and the last case in (13); if x0A < x < x
1
A then
10 S 0(x) = y1(x)z01(x) + y
0
1(x)(z1(x) 
z0(xA)) > y1(x)z
0
1(x) + y
0
1(x)(z1(x
0
A)   z0(x0A))  0; and if x1A < x < x0A then S 0(x) =
(1  y1(x))z00(x) + y01(x)(z1(x1A)  z0(x)) > (1  y1(x))z00(x) + y01(x)(z1(x1A)  z0(x0A)) > 0.
Hence, d() is strictly decreasing in x, which implies that if any type of defendant
rejects ST , it will be those who observed low x. Finally, recall that defendants who
observed x0A or x
1
A must reject ST in equilibrium, which completes the proof by showing
that there are some types at all that reject ST .
Part (ii): Note rst that z0(x
0
A) = z1(x
1
A) implies x
1
A  x0A. Hence, the second case
in (13) is the empty set. Furthermore, S() is at for x  maxfx0A; x1Ag = x0A. Last, if
x1A < x < x
0
A, then S
0(x) = (1  y1(x))z00(x) + y01(x)(z1(x1A)  z0(x)) > (1  y1(x))z00(x) +
y01(x)(z1(x
1
A)   z0(x0A)) > 0. Summing up, S() is strictly decreasing in x if x < x0A and
constant otherwise.
As a consequence, if S(x0A)D + c
d
A + c
d
T > ST , then x
0
A 62 M , a contradiction to
consistency of beliefs. Hence, S(x0A)D + c
d
A + c
d
T  ST .
Part (iii): z0(x
0
A) > z1(x
1
A) implies x
1
A < x
0
A. Hence, S() is strictly increasing in x
if x  minfx0A; x1Ag = x1A and strictly decreasing in x if x  maxfx0A; x1Ag = x0A. With
x0A; x
1
A 2M , this implies that ST  maxfS(x0A); S(x1A)gD + cdA + cdT .
If the trial court's verdict contains any information on how the appeals court will
eventually judge, case (i) is intuitively most plausible: Winning in trial court indicates
to the plainti that the defendant's private information is likely to be in the plainti's
favour, and that the appeals court is likely to rule for the plainti given any private
information of the defendant. Hence, an intuitive implication of this case is that, if the
less informed litigant has won in trial court, she will be tougher in posttrial bargaining
10Recall that S() is continuous and dierentiable in x.
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and agreement is less likely to be reached than if the better informed litigant had prevailed
in trial court.
However, depending on the exact functional forms implied by the signal technology,
the counterintuitive case (iii), where prevailing in the trial court is seen as bad news by
the plainti, cannot be ruled out in general. Hence, it is necessary to deal with case (iii)
for the sake of completeness, and the analysis of specic signal technologies in Sections 5
and 6.2 will involve identifying which of these three cases may ever occur in equilibrium.
5 The Strategic Eect
The aim of this section is to isolate the strategic eect of anticipating posttrial settlement
negotiations by assuming that the trial court's verdict does not reveal any information to
litigants on the strength of their case. Referring to the discussion in Section 3, the signal
technology is characterized by an ex-ante probability that the plainti wins in trial court
that is independent of x, y1(x) = , and by a type-x defendant's posterior probability of
being held liable in the appeals court of z1(x) = z0(x) = x that is independent of the trial
court's verdict and equal to the ex-ante probability. In this case, the trial court's verdict
does not matter for the litigants' expected payos and the plainti's beliefs. Hence, case
(ii) of Proposition 2 applies:
Lemma 3 Assume that the trial court's verdict is completely uninformative. In any
pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium (x0A; x
1
A;M) of the subgame after the plainti
has made a settlement demand ST , z0(x
0
A) = z1(x
1
A), x
0
A = x
1
A, x
0
AD + c
d
A + c
d
T  ST and
[0; x0A] M .
Proof. With the discussion of Example 2 in Section 3, we have, for every x, z0(x) = z1(x).
Hence, the plainti's posttrial optimization problem (8) is identical for both potential
outcomes of the trial up to the constant probability that the plainti wins in trial court.
Hence, x0A = x
1
A, and z0(x
0
A) = z1(x
1
A). The remaining claims made in the Lemma then
follow immediately from Proposition 2.
Lemma 3 simplies the analysis considerably: It implies that a defendant with private
information xA := x
0
A = x
1
A anticipates being indierent between accepting and rejecting
the equilibrium posttrial settlement demand later on. A defendant with private informa-
tion x < xA anticipates to reject the equilibrium posttrial settlement demand and earn
an even higher payo. Hence, if a defendant who has observed x = xA rejects the pretrial
demand ST , so will a defendant who has observed x < xA.
In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the plainti's beliefs, which are characterized byM ,
must be consistent with this strategy. On the other hand, xA must solve the plainti's
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posttrial problem (8). Hence, the range of the rst integral in (8) is simply [0; xA].
Furthermore, the second integral in (8) is the probability that x is in M but larger than
xA. Hence, denoting the probability that x is in M as  :=
R
x02M f(x
0)dx0, (8) can be
written as
xA 2 arg max
x0A2M
Z x0A
0
(xD   cpA)
f(x)

dx+ (x0AD + c
d
A)

1  F (x
0
A)


: (14)
The objective function is continuous and dierentiable in x0A, and, due to the monotoni-
cally increasing hazard rate of F (), there is a unique maximum given by the rst-order
condition
D =
f(xA)
  F (xA)(c
p
A + c
d
A) (15)
if D  f(0)
 F (0)(c
p
A + c
d
A), and xA = 0 otherwise.
Note the similarity to the rst-order condition (1) of the standard model of litigation
with just a single stage - indeed, the conditions are identical for  = 1, cpA = c
p and
cdA = c
d. Of course, the intuitive tradeo carries over from the single-stage model: If an
indierent defendant's private information xA is more favorable, this allows the plainti
to settle for a larger amount xAD. However, increasing xA comes at the cost of litigation
with the marginal type of defendant, represented by the right-hand side of (15).
The following lemma states that, for every ST , the equilibrium cuto type of defendant
for posttrial settlement, xA(ST ), and the equilibrium probability (unconditional on x) of
rejection of the pretrial demand, (ST ), are unique:
Lemma 4 Let xA be the unique xA that solves (14) for  = 1. For every ST  cdA + cdT ,
there exist unique xA(ST ) and (ST ) such that for every pure-strategy perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (x0A; x
1
A;M) of that subgame, xA(ST ) = x
0
A = x
1
A = min
n
ST cdA cdT
D
; xA
o
,
(ST ) =
R
M
f(x)dx is the ex-ante probability that the defendant rejects ST , and the plain-
ti's expected payo in that subgame is
p(ST ) =
Z xA(ST )
0
(xD   cpA   cpT )f(x)dx
+((ST )  F (xA(ST ))) (xA(ST )D + cdA   cpT ) + (1  (ST )) (xA(ST )D + cdA + cdT ):
(16)
Proof. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the subgame following a pretrial settlement
demand ST , xA is a solution to the plainti's posttrial optimization problem (14) given
,  2 [F (xA); 1] if xAD + cdA + cdT = ST , and  = 1 if xAD + cdA + cdT < ST . Note rst
that the solution xA to (14) is increasing in  due to the increasing hazard rate of F ().
Hence, the largest xA that can ever be a solution to (14) is xA, which solves (14) for
 = 1. Hence, if ST > xAD + c
d
A + c
d
T , there is no   1 such that xA = ST c
d
A cdT
D
solves
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(14), so that ST > xAD+ c
d
A+ c
d
T . However, this implies M = [0; 1] and, therefore,  = 1,
in which case the unique solution to (14) is xA = xA.
Suppose now that ST  xAD + cdA + cdT . In this case, the equilibrium xA(ST ) is
uniquely given by xA(ST ) =
ST cdA cdT
D
: If xA were below that, this would imply  = 1, in
which case the unique solution to (14) would be xA > xA, a contradiction. Furthermore,
there is a unique  such that xA(ST ) =
ST cdA cdT
D
solves (14).
To complete the proof, the plainti's equilibrium payo given by (16) is obtained by
summing up the posttrial payo (14) with probability (ST ) and the payo from pretrial
settlement ST with probability 1  (ST ).
If xA(ST )D + c
d
A + c
d
T < ST , then the defendant will reject ST no matter what his
private information is, which means that (ST ) = 1 is unique. The unique equilibrium
settlement demand in this case induces xA(ST ) = xA. An equilibrium in which some
types of defendant accept ST is possible only if xA(ST )D + c
d
A + c
d
T = ST , the left-hand
side of which is strictly increasing in x. Hence, the xA(ST ) that satises this condition is
unique. On the other hand, the solution xA to (14) is strictly increasing in , so that the
equilibrium (ST ) is also unique.
Lemma 4 is important because it establishes that, before making a pretrial settlement
demand ST , the plainti can anticipate a unique equilibrium payo in the respective
subgame following each choice of ST . An equilibrium pretrial settlement demand therefore
maximizes (16) and can be intuitively characterized by the cuto type of defendant xA
which is indierent between accepting and rejecting the equilibrium posttrial settlement
demand:
Proposition 3 Assume that the trial court's verdict is completely uninformative. In any
pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium, a case goes all the way to the appeals court if
and only if x < xA, where x

A  xA. If 0 < xA < xA, then
D =
f(xA)
1  F (xA)
(cpT + c
d
T + c
p
A + c
d
A) +
f 0(xA)
1  F (xA)
cpA + c
d
A
D
(cpT + c
d
T ): (17)
Proof. Note that, due to uniqueness of the equilibrium payos in the subgame following
any settlement demand ST , the plainti's problem of choosing ST boils down to choosing
some xA  xA so as to maximize (16), where  satises the posttrial rst-order condition
(15) for that xA. Hence, the upper bound x

A  xA follows immediately from Lemma 4,
and an interior solution can be obtained by taking the derivative of (16),
dp
dxA
= (1  F (xA))D   f(xA)(cpA + cdA) 
d
dxA
(cpT + c
d
T ):
Using the total dierential of (15), substituting for d
dxA
= f(xA) + f
0(xA)
cpA+c
d
A
D
yields
(17).
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The left-hand side and the rst summand on the right-hand side of (17) again con-
stitute the well-known tradeo from the literature on single-stage litigation systems. In
addition to that, the second summand on the right-hand side of (17) shows the eect
introduced by the possibility to appeal, which depends on the allocation of parties' total
litigation costs on the trial and the appeal stage, and on the rst derivative of the density
of the defendant's private signal. Intuitively, this term reects that the result of pretrial
settlement will inuence the plainti's cost of increasing xA in posttrial settlement bar-
gaining, f(xA)(c
p
A + c
d
A), which is litigation costs in the appeal stage times the marginal
probability of the defendant to prefer settlement.
The similarity of the equilibrium conditions of the single-stage and two-stage models,
(1) and (17), makes the two models easy to compare. The following Proposition analyzes
the eect of appeals on the set of cases that are eventually settled in some stage, and on
the defendant's expected equilibrium payo.
Proposition 4 Let D  f(0)
1 F (0)(c
p
T + c
d
T + c
p
A + c
d
A). If f
0(xA) < 0 (f
0(xA) > 0), then
the ex-ante probability that the case will be settled in some stage is lower (higher), and
the defendant's ex-ante expected payo is smaller (larger) than in a one-stage litigation
system with total legal costs cp + cd = cpT + c
d
T + c
p
A + c
d
A.
Proof. The proposition compares the present model with a one-stage model just con-
sisting of stages (i), (ii) and (viii) and legal costs cp + cd = cpT + c
d
T + c
p
A + c
d
A. The
condition D  f(0)
1 F (0)(c
p
T + c
d
T + c
p
A+ c
d
A) implies that the unique equilibrium of the latter
model is given by (1). Furthermore, recall the denition of xA, D =
f(xA)
1 F (xA)(c
p
A + c
d
A),
which is strictly smaller than f(xA)
1 F (xA)(c
p + cd). Summing up, the unique equilibrium of
the single-stage model satises
0 < x < xA: (18)
Suppose rst that f 0(xA) < 0. If 0 < x

A < xA, x

A satises (17), which implies
D <
f(xA)
1 F (xA)(c
p + cd) and, with Proposition 1, x < xA. If x

A = xA, then x
 < xA is
trivially implied by (18). xA = 0 cannot occur, as a necessary condition for this would
be that D < f(0)
1 F (0)(c
p
T + c
d
T + c
p
A+ c
d
A), a contradiction to a condition of the Proposition.
Suppose now that f 0(xA) > 0. If 0 < x

A < xA, x

A satises (17), which implies
D >
f(xA)
1 F (xA)(c
p + cd) and, with Proposition 1, x > xA. If x

A = 0, then x
 > xA is
trivially implied by (18). xA = xA cannot occur, as a necessary condition for this would
be that D > f(xA)
1 F (xA)(c
p
A + c
d
A), a contradiction to the denition of xA.
Proposition 4 shows that the direction in which the appeals system aects equilibrium
crucially depends on the distribution from which the defendant's private information is
drawn: In a system with appeals, the plainti's pretrial settlement demand also seeks to
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optimize the cost-benet tradeo that governs posttrial bargaining. As the marginal cost
of increasing xA is positively related to the marginal probability that the defendant prefers
settlement, introducing the additional level of jurisdiction has shifted the defendant's
equilibrium cut-o type in the direction of lower density.
6 The Information Eect
6.1 Some General Results
In this section, it will be analyzed how the litigants' equilibrium settlement behavior is
aected when they can use the trial court's outcome to update their expectations on how
the appeals court will eventually judge. Depending on the exact nature of the signal
technology, the plainti may use the trial court's verdict to update her beliefs on the
private information x that the defendant has observed, and both litigants may update
their expectations of how the appeals court will eventually judge for given x. Hence,
winning (losing) in trial court makes the plainti more (less) condent of winning in the
appeals court, and therefore it is plausible for her to demand a higher (lower) amount
in the posttrial settlement negotiation. Recalling Lemma 2, this latter conclusion is
equivalent to z1(x
1
A) > z0(x
0
A), which is exactly how case (i) of Proposition 2 is dened.
Hence, the intuitively most appealing case of that Proposition is the rst one, which is
why this Subsection is devoted to characterizing equilibria for general signal technologies
under the assumption that equilibrium satises this intuitively appealing condition.
Note, however, that contrary to this intuitive argument, the plainti's optimal choice
of posttrial settlement demand will depend on the marginal eect of the trial court's
verdict on litigants' expectations of how the appeals court may judge. Hence, it is not
possible to rule out the third case of Proposition 2 for general signal technologies, so
that it is necessary to rule it out whenever one discusses a specic signal technology. I
will analyze such a specic signal technology in the next Subsection. It will turn out
that any perfect Bayesian equilibrium must be according to case (i) of Proposition 2.
Furthermore, this specic signal technology will serve as an example for the possibility
of some counter-intuitive comparative statics regarding the impact of legal costs and the
trial court's accuracy on litigants' incentives to settle.
Under case (i) of Proposition 2 and using (10), the plainti's posttrial objective func-
tion (8) can be simplied to
xrA 2 arg max
xA2[0;xT ]
Z xA
0
(zr(x)D   cpA)y(x)f(x)dx+ (zr(xA)D + cdA)
Z xT
xA
y(x)f(x)dx; (19)
where xT is the threshold type of defendant dened in case (i) of Proposition 2 above
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which the defendant rejects the pretrial settlement demand. The rst-order condition is
z0r(x
r
A)D =
yr(x
r
A)f(x
r
A)R xT
xrA
y(x)f(x)dx
(cpA + c
d
A): (20)
The following Lemma presents some results on the plainti's optimal choice of posttrial
settlement demand.
Lemma 5 Consider a pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the subgame after
the plainti's pretrial settlement demand that is governed by case (i) of Proposition 2.
(i) If y1(0) = 0, then x
1
A > 0. Furthermore, x
0
A = 0 for suciently at z0() and
y1(0) < 1.
(ii) If the function y(x)f(x) exhibits an increasing hazard rate and zr() is weakly con-
cave on (0; 1), there is at most one xA that satises the rst-order condition (20).
In this case, the equilibrium choice of xrA is the unique solution of (20) and strictly
increasing in xT if it exists, and x
r
A = 0 otherwise.
Proof. Note rst being in case (i) of Proposition 2 immediately rules out xT = 0, as in
this case the trivial posttrial equilibrium would be x0A = x
1
A = 0. Hence, xT > 0.
Part (i): The rst derivative of the objective function in (19) w.r.t. xA is
z0r(xA)
Z xT
xA
y(x)f(x)dxD   yr(xA)f(xA)(cpA + cdA);
which is strictly positive for xA = 0 if yr(0) = 0. Hence, x
1
A > 0 whenever y1(0) = 0.
Furthermore, for y0(0) > 0 (which is equivalent to y1(0) < 1) and suciently small z
0
r(),
the derivative of the objective function will be negative for all xA 2 [0; 1], which implies
x0A = 0.
Part (ii): y(x)f(x) exhibiting an increasing hazard rate implies that the right-hand
side of (20) is strictly increasing in xA, and zr() being weakly concave implies that the
left-hand side of (20) is strictly decreasing in xA. Hence, there can be at most one xA
that satises (20). If a solution of (20) does not exist, xrA = xT is ruled out by Lemma
1, which leaves xrA = 0 as the only alternative.
Suppose now that xrA > 0 satises (20). Taking the total dierential of (20) yields
dxrA
dxT
=
yr(xT )f(xT )z
0
r(x
r
A)Dh
yr(xrA)f(x
r
A)z
0
r(x
r
A)  z00r (xrA)
R xT
xrA
y(x)f(x)dx
i
D + [y0r(x
r
A)f(x
r
A) + yr(x
r
A)f
0(xrA)] (c
p
A + c
d
A)
which is strictly positive whenever z00r (x)  0.
If the defendant's private signal is suciently informative also for predicting the trial
court's decision, a case will go to the appeals court with strictly positive probability after
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the plainti has won in trial court. The plainti infers having a weak case from the fact
that the defendant has rejected the pretrial demand, but infers having a strong case from
the trial court's decision. Hence, it is suciently unlikely that the defendant has observed
a very low x as to make it worthwhile for the plainti to make a settlement demand that
these low-x types of defendant will reject.
On the other hand, this is not necessarily true if the defendant has won in trial court:
In this case, both the fact that the defendant is obviously condent and the trial court
outcome make the plainti believe that the defendant is suciently likely to have observed
a very low x that she prefers to settle even with these low types of defendant.
Part (ii) of Lemma 5 translates the uniqueness of the solution of the standard, single-
instance model's rst-order condition (1) to posttrial bargaining. If the distribution of the
plainti's beliefs satises the increasing-hazard-rate condition, which is usually imposed
on the ex-ante distribution of types in the single-stage model, then the right-hand side,
divided by the integral, is increasing in xrA. Hence, if the left-hand side is non-increasing
(which is always the case in (1), as it is independent of x), the result follows immediately.
However, note that this latter condition may not hold in posttrial bargaining, espe-
cially for the case that lT = 0 in which the defendant will typically be more optimistic
and revise his expectations of losing in the appeals court to below x: For instance, if
signals are independent (see Example 1 in Section 3), z0(x) is convex, which means that
the defendant's revision of expectations is larger for intermediate levels of observed x.
In this sense, part (ii) of Lemma 5 points out another potential complication that may
arise in the analysis of posttrial bargaining after the defendant has won in trial court, as
opposed to settlement negotiation in the single-instance model.
The second result presented in Part (ii) of Lemma 5 is that, under the same set of
assumptions that guarantees an interior posttrial solution, posttrial equilibrium choices
are monotonic in pretrial choices. That is to say, if the ex-ante probability that the
defendant rejects the pretrial settlement demand is high (which means that the pretrial
demand was high), then the ex-ante probability that the case will go all the way to the
appeals court is also high, which also means that the posttrial settlement demand is high.
Assuming that, for every pretrial settlement demand ST , there is a pure-strategy
perfect Bayesian equilibrium characterized by case (i) of Proposition 2, the plainti will
anticipate equilibrium SrA, x
r
A and xT > maxfx0A; x1Ag when choosing ST . Using the results
from Section 4, the plainti's objective is equivalent to choosing xT so as to maximize
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p(xT ) =
X
r
"Z xrA
0
(zr(x)D   cpA)yr(x)f(x)dx+ (zr(xrA)D + cdA   cpT )
Z xT
xrA
yr(x)f(x)dx
#
+
"X
r
(yr(xT )zr(x
r
A))D + c
d
A + c
d
T
#Z 1
xT
f(x)dx:
(21)
The following Proposition presents the rst-order condition of an interior optimum and
species conditions under which it will be satised in perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Proposition 5 Assume that there is a pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the
subgame after making the pretrial settlement demand that is governed by case (i) of Propo-
sition 2, and let the conditions of Part (ii) of Lemma 5 be satised and y1(0) be suciently
small as to guarantee x1A > 0 for every xT .
If D is suciently large and cpA + c
d
A and f(0) are suciently small, then there is a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium such that the case is settled pretrial if and only if x  xT ,
where xT satises the rst-order condition(
y01(x

T )(z1(x
1
A)  z0(x0A)) +
X
r

z0r(x
r
A)
dxrA
dxT
yr(x

T )
)
D =
f(xT )
1  F (xT )
(cdT + c
p
T ): (22)
Proof. The rst-order condition (22) is obtained by taking the rst derivative of the
objective function (21) w.r.t. xT . Let us denote this objective function T (xT ). A
sucient set of conditions for xT to satisfy this rst-order condition in a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium is that (i) T (xT ) is indeed the relevant objective function, (ii) the rst
derivative of this objective function satises limxT&0
0
T (0) > 0 and 
0
T (1) < 0, and (iii)
the rst derivative of the objective function 0T () is continuous except for a nite set
(xid), where for every i, limxT%xid 
0
T (xT ) < limxT&xid 
0
T (xT ).
The rst condition is guaranteed by assumption. As for the third condition, continuity
of 0T () depends on the impact of xT on the posttrial choices xrA(xT ): Low xT may imply
a boundary solution xrA(xT ) = 0 for some r 2 f0; 1g. Due to Part (ii) of Lemma 5,
xrA are increasing in xT whenever they are positive. Hence, there may be up to two
discontinuities at xrd := maxfxT : xrA(xT ) = 0g. Furthermore,
lim
xT&xid
0T (xT )  lim
xT%xid
0T (xT ) = z
0
r(x
r
A)
dxrA
dxT
yr(x
r
d)D(1  F (xrd)) > 0
again due to Part (ii) of Lemma 5.
As for the second condition, note rst that 1   F (1) = 0 as F () is a probability
density function, and recall that zr() and yr() are dierentiable by assumption. Hence,
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0T (1) =  f(1)(cdT + cpT ) < 0. Furthermore, limxT&0(z1(x1A)  z0(x0A)) = 0, so that
lim
xT&0
0T (0) =
X
r

z0r(0)
dxrA(0)
dxT
yr(0)

D(1  F (0))  f(0)(cdT + cpT );
which is increasing in D and decreasing in (cdT + c
p
T ) and f(0), as long as x
r
A is not a
boundary solution for at least r = 1, which is guaranteed by the assumption of suciently
large y1(0).
Intuitively, in order to establish the interior solution as an equilibrium, it is necessary
to rule out the boundary solutions xT = 0 and xT = 1 as well as potentially those points
at which the objective function may not dierentiable. It turns out that the assumptions
made in Part (ii) of Lemma 5 already rule out xT = 1 and the non-dierentiable points
if they exist. Hence, if, in addition to these assumptions, the potential gain D for the
plainti is suciently large compared to the legal costs and the defendant is suciently
unlikely to privately know to have a very strong case as to rule out that the plainti wants
to settle pretrial with certainty (xT = 0), the equilibrium x

T will satisfy the rst-order
condition (22).
Let us now examine this rst-order condition (22) in more detail: The right-hand side
is the well-known marginal cost of making a tougher settlement demand that already
appears in the rst-order condition (1) of the standard, single-instance model: The de-
fendant will accept such a higher settlement demand with lower ex-ante probability, so
that the litigation costs of the trial court cdT + c
p
T will be incurred with higher probabil-
ity, represented by the hazard rate f(xT )
1 F (xT ) . The dierence introduced by the possibility
of an appeal is related to the expected marginal benet of making a higher settlement
demand, which is on the left-hand side of the rst-order condition. While this marginal
benet is just D in the standard model (see again equation (1)), there are two eects
in the two-stage model: First, there is a strategic eect similar to that introduced in
Section 5, captured by the second summand in the expression in curly brackets on the
left-hand side of (22),
P
r

z0r(x
r
A)
dxrA
dxT
yr(xT )

D. This eect is just the average impact
of settling with lower probability pretrial on the probability of settling posttrial in equi-
librium, and therefore also on the plainti's equilibrium posttrial payo. Intuitively, the
plainti chooses the pretrial settlement demand so as to optimize her strategic position
in the eventual posttrial settlement negotiation.
The second eect, captured by the rst summand in the expression in curly brack-
ets on the left-hand side of (22), y01(xT )(z1(x
1
A)   z0(x0A))D, is related to the litigants
anticipating the way in which the information revealed by the trial court's verdict will
eventually translate into posttrial payos. This is why I will refer to this eect as the
information eect. The information eect is made up of the dierence in equilibrium
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posttrial settlement payment S1A S0A = (z1(x1A)  z0(x0A))D after the plainti versus the
defendant having won in trial court, and the impact y01(xT ) of settling with less types
of defendant pretrial on the probability of winning the marginal case in the trial court.
Intuitively, making a tougher pretrial settlement demand is more attractive for the plain-
ti if (i) this increases the probability y1(xT ) of winning the marginal case in trial court
to a larger extent, and (ii) good news in trial court translate more heavily into posttrial
equilibrium payos.
Note that, due to the increasing-hazard-rate assumption for F (), it is sucient to
compare the left-hand side of (22) under dierent sets of assumptions to compare xT and
thus the probabilities of a pretrial settlement in these cases: If the equilibrium marginal
type ~xT of defendant that settles pretrial under a certain set of assumptions causes the
left-hand side of (22) to be larger than the right-hand side under some other set of
assumptions, then the equilibrium marginal type xT under this latter set of assumptions
will be larger than ~xT , which means that a case will go to trial court with a larger
probability in the latter case.
6.2 Example: Identical Conditional Probabilities
In the preceding Subsection I have analyzed equilibrium assuming it to satisfy certain
conditions. Whether these assumptions indeed hold, and in which direction the strategic
and the information eects move equilibrium choices, will need to be assessed for spe-
cic given signal technologies. In this Subsection I will, therefore, illustrate some typical
features of the information eect for a special class of signal technologies in which, condi-
tional on the defendant's private signal x, the interim probabilities for the plainti to win
in the trial court and for her to win in the appeals court are both equal to x, which means
that y1(x) = x = 1   y0(x). In order to capture the eect of the trial court's accuracy,
I assume that with probability  the trial court perfectly anticipates the appeals court's
eventual verdict (lT = lA), and with probability 1    it just randomizes between each
outcome using the probabilities x and 1   x, and that the 'type' of trial court is unob-
servable to litigants. Hence,  is a proxy for the trial court's accuracy: For high values
of , the appeals court is very unlikely to overturn the trial court's decision. If, on the
other hand,  is low, observing the trial court's verdict is still useful for the plainti to
update her beliefs on the defendant's private information, whereas litigants cannot learn
much new on the appeals court's eventual verdict for given x.
Following the discussion in Section 3, the signal technologies analyzed in this section
are characterized by pr(x), which are equal to 1 with probability , and equal to those
given in Example 3 with probability 1   , i.e. p1(x) =  + (1   )x and p0(x) =
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+ (1  )(1  x). It follows that
z1(x) = + (1  )x
z0(x) = (1  )x:
Furthermore, I will simplify the analysis by assuming that the defendant's private
information is ex-ante uniformly distributed. This assumption also allows me to better
focus on the information eect, as it rules out some of the purely strategic eect analyzed
in section 5.11 The following lemma characterizes equilibrium of the subgame following
the plainti's pretrial settlement demand ST .
Lemma 6 Assume that the trial court perfectly anticipates the appeals court's eventual
decision with probability , and judges according to Example 3 with probability 1  , and
that the defendant's private information is ex-ante uniformly distributed. Then:
(i) There is no pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium that is characterized by cases
(ii) or (iii) of Proposition 2.
(ii) The unique pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the subgame following any
pretrial settlement demand ST > c
d
T + c
d
A is characterized by x
0
A, x
1
A and xT which
satisfy:
ST =

xT (+ (1  )x1A) + (1  xT )(1  )x0A

D + cdA + c
d
T (23)
x1A =  
ZA
1   +
s
Z2A
(1  )2 + x
2
T (24)
x0A = max
(
1  ZA
1    
s
Z2A
(1  )2 + (1  xT )
2; 0
)
; (25)
where ZA :=
cdA+c
p
A
D
is the ratio of total litigation costs in the appeals court and the amount
in dispute.
Proof. For all proofs of this Subsection see the Appendix.
Taking the partial derivative of (24) and (25) with respect to  conrms the straight-
forward intuition that, for a given set of cases that go to trial court in equilibrium, a case
will be settled posttrial with a higher probability if the appeals court is more costly and
trial court more accurate: If it is known that the appeals court will probably judge in
11Recall from Proposition 4 that with uniformly distributed x, litigants' anticipation of appeals has
no impact in the absence of the information eect.
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the same way as the trial court, there is no need to incur the additional legal costs of the
appeals court.
Furthermore, due to y(0) = 0 in this example, Part (i) of Lemma 5 applies which
states that posttrial settlement will, in equilibrium, be governed by an interior solution
after the plainti has won in trial court, i.e. the case will be settled posstrial and go
to the appeals court with strictly positive probabilities. However, if the defendant has
won in trial court, there may be a boundary solution posttrial: (25) implies that such
a case will always be settled posttrial if (1   xT )2  1   2ZA1  , which is satised if the
probability of the case not being settled pretrial was already low, the litigation costs in
the appeals stage are suciently high relative to the potential damages, and the trial
court is suciently accurate.
Let us now turn to the plainti's choice of pretrial settlement demand. Part (i) of
Lemma 6 conrms that, for any choice of ST , the subsequent equilibrium will be of the
type described in case (i) of Proposition 2, i.e. the defendant's decision of whether to
accept such a settlement demand depends in a strictly monotonic way on his private
information: If this private information indicates that he is going to win in the appeals
court with a high probability, then his expected payo from the trial court and posttrial
settlement negotiation will also be high. Hence, he will reject ST if and only if x is below
a certain threshold xT .
The rst-order condition for the plainti's optimal choice of pretrial settlement de-
mand can therefore be obtained by using Lemma 6 to substitute for the subsequent
equilibrium choices in (22). The following Proposition species under which conditions
this rst-order condition is also sucient:
Proposition 6 If the signal technology is as described in Lemma 6 and   c
p
T+c
d
T
D
, there
is some xT such that in any pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium the case is settled
pretrial if and only if x  xT , where xT satises the rst-order condition8<:+ (1  )
0@ 1 +
vuut4xT 2 + Z4A(1 )4Z2
A
(1 )2+x

T
2
+
vuut4(1  xT )2 + Z4A(1 )4Z2
A
(1 )2+(1 xT )2
1A9=;D = cpT + cdT1  xT
(26)
if (1  xT )2 < 1  2ZA1  , and8<:+ (1  )
0@  ZA
1   +
vuut4xT 2 + Z4A(1 )4Z2
A
(1 )2+x

T
2
1A9=;D = cpT + cdT1  xT (27)
if (1  xT )2 > 1  2ZA1  .
Specically, if

cpT+c
d
T
D
2
< 1  2ZA
1  , then x

T > 1  c
p
T+c
d
T
D
.
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In line with the ndings for general signal technologies presented in Proposition 5,
Proposition 6 shows that there will be an interior equilibrium settlement demand (in the
sense that it will be accepted and rejected with positive probabilities) if   c
p
T+c
d
T
D
, that
is to say, if the trial court is suciently accurate (high ), the stakes D are suciently
large and trial costs cdT + c
p
T suciently low.
Taking a closer look at the rst-order conditions, it turns out that the left-hand side
of (26) is always larger than D and the left-hand side of (27) always larger than D. The
right-hand sides are weakly smaller than D whenever xT  1  c
p
T+c
d
T
D
and weakly smaller
than D whenever xT  1  c
p
T+c
d
T
D
. Hence, an equilibrium xT that satises the rst-order
condition (26) [(27)] must be above 1  c
p
T+c
d
T
D
[1  c
p
T+c
d
T
D
].
Furthermore, if the lower bound 1  c
p
T+c
d
T
D
for the interior solution given by the rst-
order condition (27) (which is the relevant condition for the case of the posttrial boundary
solution x0A = 0) is above the domain that is relevant for this condition, this immediately
excludes the possibility of the posttrial boundary solution x0A = 0 to occur in any perfect
Bayesian equilibrium of the entire game. This is exactly the case that is highlighted by
the last claim of Proposition 6: If

cpT+c
d
T
D
2
< 1   2ZA
1  , then the objective function is
increasing throughout the domain (1 xT )2 > 1  2ZA1  under which the posttrial boundary
solution x0A = 0 occurs, which implies that equilibrium will always satisfy (26), for which
case we have just established that xT > 1  c
p
T+c
d
T
D
.
Proposition 6 allows us to analyze the impact of litigation costs on litigants' incentives
to settle. While the following proposition shows the expected positive eect of litigation
costs in the trial stage on settlement incentives, it establishes the somewhat surprising
result that, if equilibrium satises the rst-order condition 26, higher litigation costs in
the appeal stage actually increase the probability that a case goes to the trial court:12
Proposition 7 Let the signal technology be as described in Lemma 6, assume

cpT+c
d
T
D
2
<
1  2ZA
1  , and consider a marginal change in the total legal cost of the trial stage c
d
T + c
p
T
(of the appeals stage cdA + c
p
A). Then there is at least one perfect Bayesian equilibrium
before and after the change such that the equilibrium probability that the case goes to the
trial court xT has decreased (increased) due to the change.
Higher litigation costs in the trial stage increase the right-hand side of the rst-order
condition (26), which implies that xT must be reduced. Hence, just like in the well-known
12Note that, while it is readily established that, under the conditions formulated in Proposition 7, xT
must satisfy the rst-order condition (26) in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, multiplicity of equilibrium
cannot be ruled out. Hence, the comparative statics result presented in Proposition 7 holds only for
continuous changes in the equilibrium xT . However, such a continuously changing equilibrium always
exists for every marginal parameter change.
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single-stage model summarized in Proposition 1, higher litigation costs encourage out-
of-court settlement. In order to understand why increasing the litigation costs of appeal
has the opposite eect, it will be useful to look at both eects identied in the discussion
of the rst-order condition (22) separately: The marginal types of defendant who settle
posttrial, x1A and x
0
A given by (24) and (25) are increasing in xT , but this eect is smaller
for higher litigation costs in the appeals stage. Hence, the impact of settling pretrial with
lower probability on the plainti's posttrial payo, which we have labelled the 'strategic
eect', gets smaller as cdA + c
p
A increases which would imply a decreasing equilibrium x

T .
However, the 'information eect', which captures how litigants anticipate the later use
of the information revealed by the trial court, works in the opposite direction and turns
out to dominate the strategic eect: Although, in the case of interior equilibria posttrial
implied by the condition (1  xT )2 < 1  2ZA1  , equilibrium posttrial settlement payments
S1A and S
0
A for both possible trial outcomes are falling in the litigation costs, those after
the defendant has won in trial court are more heavily aected by the litigation costs, so
that the dierence S1A   S0A is increasing in cdA + cpA. This makes it more attractive for
the plainti to win in trial court and thus reduces her incentives to settle pretrial.
The intuitive reason for why S1A S0A is increasing in cdA+cpA is that losing in trial court
makes the plainti also pessimistic on the appeals court's eventual judgment. Hence,
losing in trial court reduces the impact y0r() of the posttrial settlement demand SrA on
the plainti's marginal cost of settling with lower probability posttrial (see the right-hand
side of (20)). Consequently, for a given increase in legal costs, the plainti will reduce
equilibrium posttrial settlement demand after losing in trial court more than after winning
in trial court. In other words, the plainti's choice of posttrial settlement demand is less
sensitive to parameter changes if she has lost in trial court. Hence, if a parameter change
reduces equilibrium posttrial settlement demands after any outcome in the trial court,
as the increase in the legal cost of the appeals stage does, it will increase the dierence
S1A S0A in the plainti's posttrial payos after winning and losing in trial court. As this
mechanism is just based on the identity y0(x)  1  y1(x) and therefore y00(x) =  y01(x),
it seems safe to argue that the information eect being countervailing to the strategic
eect is a typical feature of interior equilibria of the game.
Another interesting question is whether a trial court that is more accurate in predicting
the appeals court's eventual decision will attract more cases in the rst place. Let us
start by considering two extreme cases, a perfectly accurate and a purely randomizing
trial court. As the perfectly accurate trial court is characterized by  = 1, posttrial
settlement bargaining after the defendant has prevailed in trial court is given by the
boundary solution x0A = 0 for every xT , which, together with  = 1 >
cdT+c
p
T
D
, implies that
the equilibrium xT is given by (27). Substituting for  = 1 in (27) yields the rst-order
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condition xT = 1  c
d
T+c
p
T
D
.
As for the other extreme case in which the trial court only randomizes, note rst that
this case is not equivalent to the case  = 0 in the example discussed in this Subsection
- even this lowest possible accuracy reveals some information on the appeals court's
eventual judgment to the plainti, as the trial court is known to decide for the plainti
with the probability x privately observed by the defendant. Instead, we must go back
to the analysis in Section 5, where (15) and (17) together imply that if the defendant's
private information is ex ante uniformly distributed, as it is assumed throughout this
Subsection, the probability that the case goes to trial court is  = 1  cdT+c
p
T
D
.
The surprising result of this exercise is that a perfectly accurate trial court will be used
with exactly the same ex-ante probability as a purely randomizing court. An immediate
conclusion is that, unless equilibrium choices are completely independent of the trial
court's accuracy, it is always possible to nd two signal technologies such that the less
accurate trial court will be used with higher ex-ante probability in equilibrium. Indeed,
it is shown in Proposition 6 that, as long as stakes are suciently high relative to the
legal costs of the trial court and  is not too high as to ensure an interior solution given
by the rst-order condition (26), a case will go to trial court with a higher probability
than in either of the extreme cases just discussed. The following proposition summarizes
this result and is presented without proof:
Proposition 8 Consider a signal technology as described in Lemma 6. If

cpT+c
d
T
D
2
< 1 
2ZA
1  , such an intermediately accurate trial court will be used with higher ex-ante probability
than a perfectly accurate trial court ( = 1), which in turn will be used with identical ex-
ante probability as the completely uninformative trial court discussed in Section 5.
Intuitively, a very inaccurate trial court's decision won't inuence posttrial equilibrium
payos much. Due to the aforementioned eect that smaller dierences in the plainti's
posttrial equilibrium payos across trial court outcomes increase her incentive to settle
pretrial, a very inaccurate trial court will be used with rather low probability. Hence,
making the trial court slightly more accurate than that will increase the probability
that it is used. However, as the trial court's accuracy increases further, the defendant's
informational advantage in posttrial settlement negotiation vanishes. Anticipating his
lower information rent in posttrial bargaining, the defendant will be easier to convince of
settling pretrial, which brings the probability that the court is used back down again.
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7 Conclusions
This paper has identied two eects through which the possibility of an appeal will in-
uence asymmetrically informed litigants' incentives to settle: The strategic eect makes
litigants consider in pretrial negotiations the strategic environment in which posttrial
settlement negotiations will eventually take place and follows a similar intuition as the
literature on sequential bargaining with asymmetric information. The second eect is the
information eect which makes litigants anticipate how the information revealed by the
trial court's verdict will inuence equilibrium posttrial payos.
The main lesson from this paper is that taking into account the trial court's verdict as
a public signal on the appeals court's eventual decision may yield the following surprising
results: It turns out that the information eect implies higher incentives to settle pretrial
if posttrial equilibrium payos are insensitive to the trial court's verdict, which is typically
the case if legal costs are high. Furthermore, a very accurate trial court reduces the
defendant's posttrial information rent and makes him more willing to accept a given
pretrial settlement demand.
A policy discussion to which these results may make an important contribution is
that on the optimal design of the legal process. In general, a social planner may decide
on whether to invest in more or less levels of jurisdictions, and whether to invest more or
less in the accuracy of the existing courts. For instance, Shavell (1995) compares costs
and benets of adding a level of jurisdiction, arguing that due to convex costs of avoiding
judicial errors at each level two imperfectly accurate levels of court are socially preferable
to a single, more accurate court. However, Shavell assumes that litigants are perfectly
informed but cannot settle. The present paper relaxes these assumptions and suggests
that litigants' settlement behavior may aect social welfare in dierent ways as a result
of such a legal reform.
Of course, my results depend on various simplifying assumptions which may be relaxed
in future research. First, a potential way of relating my analysis to the main line of the
economic literature of appeals cited in the introduction would be to extend the model
to allow for courts to act strategically or to update their information using a potentially
better informed litigant's actions. Another group of strategic players that has not been
addressed in my model is solicitors, whose incentives may not be aligned with their
clients' depending on the compensation scheme in use. As for the timing of the game, I
have made the simplifying assumption that the case always goes to court if settlement
negotiations break down, which rules out those credibility issues addressed by Nalebu
(1987). Allowing for these credibility issues may create interesting countervailing eects
and, therefore, be a worthwhile task for future research. Finally, when using the model
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presented in this paper for a welfare analysis of legal reform, it should be kept in mind that
changes in the equilibrium of the litigation game may be interrelated with the incentives
for the underlying actions before litigation takes place like, for instance, an injurer's
decision to take precautions.13
A feature of my model that practitioners may feel uncomfortable with is that I do
not address the appeals court's accuracy in nding the 'truly' correct decision at all. The
reason why I ignored this question is that the paper's focus is on deriving generally valid
results on litigants' settlement incentives. All that rational, monetary payo maximizing
litigants care about is the highest court's eventual decision. The results that I derive
in this model are therefore valid whether or not the appeals court's decision is correct.
Having said this, the issue of the appeals court's accuracy may be important when ana-
lyzing welfare eects, and if litigants suer non-monetary preference costs when the legal
system errs to their disadvantage.
Appendix: Proofs for Subsection 6.2
A Proof of Lemma 6
Suppose there is an equilibrium that is characterized by case (iii) of Proposition 2. Then,
in the interval x1A < x < x
0
A, S(x) = [ + (1   )(1   x + x1A)]x is strictly convex.
Hence, in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium characterized by case (iii) of Proposition 2
there must be unique xT and x
0
T such that S(xT )D+ c
d
A + c
d
T = S(x
0
T )D+ c
d
A + c
d
T = ST ,
x1A < xT < x
0
T < x
0
A andM = [0; xT ][[x0T ; 1]. Furthermore, by symmetry of the quadratic
function S(),
x0T =
1
1   + x
1
A   xT : (28)
Let r := Prob(x 2M ^ lT = r) =
R
M
yr(x)dx. When choosing a posttrial settlement
demand after a trial court's verdict lT = r, the plainti's objective function (8) becomes,
in our example,
rA(xA) =
( R xA
0
(zr(x)D   cpA)yr(x)r dx+ (zr(xA)D + cdA)
R
[xA;xT ][[x0T ;1]
yr(x)
r
dx; if xA  xT ;R
[0;xT ][[x0T ;xA]
(zr(x)D   cpA)yr(x)r dx+ (z1(xA)D + cdA)
R 1
xA
yr(x)
r
dx; if xA  x0T ,
the rst derivative of which is
r0A(xA) =
(
 yr(xA)
r
(cdA + c
p
A) + z
0
r(xA)D
R
[xA;xT ][[x0T ;1]
yr(x)
r
dx; if xA  xT ;
 yr(xA)
r
(cdA + c
p
A) + z
0
r(xA)D
R 1
xA
yr(x)
r
dx; if xA  x0T ,
(29)
13See, for instance, P'ng (1987), Spier (1994), Shavell (1999), Hylton (2002) and Landeo, Nikitin, and
Baker (2007).
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As both parts of r0A() are strictly decreasing in xA, local maxima for either part are
given by the rst-order conditions.
Due to our initial supposition of being in case (iii) of Proposition 2, we have x1A  xT ,
which is given by the rst-order condition based on the rst case of (29):
 x1A(cdA + cpA) + (1  )D
1
2

x2T   x1A2 + 1  x0T 2

= 0;
which, with ZA =
cdA+c
p
A
D
, implies that
x1A =  
ZA
1   +
s
Z2A
(1  )2 + 1  x
0
T
2
+ x2T : (30)
Similarly, Proposition 2 requires that x0T  x0A, so that x0A is given by the rst-order
condition based on the second case of (29):
 (1  x0A)(cdA + cpA) + (1  )D
1
2
(1  x0A)2 = 0;
which implies that
x0A = 1 
2ZA
1  : (31)
However, this interior solution is not an element of the relevant domain (x0T ; 1]:
x0T =
1
1   + x
1
A   xT = 1 
2ZA
1   +
+ ZA
1     xT +
s
Z2A
(1  )2 + 1  x
0
T
2
+ x2T
> 1  2ZA
1   +
ZA
1     xT +
s
Z2A
(1  )2 + x
2
T
> 1  2ZA
1   = x
0
A:
Hence, for all xA > x
0
T , 
0
A(xA) < 
0
A(x
0
T ). As 
0
A(x
0
T ) < 
0
A(xT ), it follows that the
plainti's optimal choice after lT = 0 is some x
0
A  xT , a contradiction to case (iii) of
Proposition 2.
Consider therefore an equilibrium characterized by cases (i) or (ii) of Proposition 2.
Dene r := Prob(x 2 M ^ lT = r) =
R
M
yr(x)dx. As [0;maxfx0A; x1Ag]  M , we can
rewrite the plainti's posttrial objective function (8) as
rA(xA) =
Z xA
0
(zr(x)D   cpA)
yr(x)
r
dx+ (zr(xA)D + c
d
A)

1 
Z xA
0
yr(x)
r
dx

:
Taking the partial derivative w.r.t. xA yields the rst-order conditions
 x1A(cdA + cpA) +
1
2
(1  )D(21   x1A2) = 0
 (1  x0A)(cdA + cpA) +
1
2
(1  )D  (1  x0A)2   (1  20) = 0;
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which imply
x1A =  
ZA
1   +
s
Z2A
(1  )2 + 21 (32)
x0A = max
(
1  ZA
1    
s
Z2A
(1  )2 + (1  20); 0
)
; (33)
Let us compare x1A and x
0
A. Note rst that x
1
A > 0. Hence, if x
0
A = 0, then x
0
A < x
1
A.
If x0A > 0, then
x1A   x0A =
s
Z2A
(1  )2 + 21 +
s
Z2A
(1  )2 + (1  20)  1
=
s
Z2A
(1  )2 + 2
Z
M
xdx+
s
Z2A
(1  )2 + 1  2
Z
M
(1  x)dx  1:
The integrand in the rst square root is smaller than that in the second one if and
only if x < 1
2
. Hence, the above expression is minimized by M =

0; 1
2

, in which case
2
R
M
xdx = 1  2 R
M
(1  x)dx = 1
4
, which implies that x1A   x0A  2
q
Z2A
(1 )2 +
1
4
  1 > 0.
However, this is a contradiction to case (ii) of Proposition 2, which proves that equilibrium
in this example must be characterized by case (i) of that Proposition.
Now that it is known that equilibrium is characterized by case (i) of Proposition 2,
we can use M = [0; xT ] to substitute for 21 = x
2
T and 20 = 1   (1   xT )2 in (32) and
(33) and thereby obtain (24) and (25). 
B Proof of Proposition 6
(26) and (27) are obtained by using (24) and (25) to substitute for x0A, x
1
A,
dx0A
dxT
and
dx0A
dxT
in (22): If x0A > 0, the expression in curly brackets in (22) becomes
+ (1  )(x1A   x0A) + (1  )
0@ x2Tq
Z2A
(1 )2 + x
2
T
+
(1  xT )2q
Z2A
(1 )2 + (1  xT )2
1A
= + (1  )
0@ 1 + Z2A(1 )2 + 2x2Tq
Z2A
(1 )2 + x
2
T
+
Z2A
(1 )2 + 2(1  xT )2q
Z2A
(1 )2 + (1  xT )2
1A
which is equal to the expression in curly brackets in (26). Note furthermore from (25)
that x0A > 0 if and only if (1  xT )2 < 1  2ZA1  .
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If (1  xT )2  1  2ZA1  , then x0A  0 and, therefore,
dx0A
dxT
= 0. Hence, the expression in
curly brackets in (22) becomes
+ (1  )x1A + (1  )
x2Tq
Z2A
(1 )2 + x
2
T
= + (1  )
0@  ZA
1   +
Z2A
(1 )2 + 2x
2
Tq
Z2A
(1 )2 + x
2
T
1A
which is equal to the expression in curly brackets in (27).
It remains to show that the optimum indeed satises the rst-order condition. Note
rst that the conditions listed in the rst paragraph of Proposition 5 are satised: As
shown in Lemma 6, equilibrium is governed by case (i) of Proposition 2. Furthermore,
y(x)f(x) = x exhibits an increasing hazard rate and both zr() are dierentiable and
weakly concave on (0; 1). According to the proof of Proposition 5, under these assump-
tions the equilibrium pretrial choice xT satises the rst-order condition (26) or (27) if
and only if the rst derivative of the objective function at xT = 0 is positive.
To check whether this is the case, note that 1 > 1 2ZA
1  , which implies that limxT&0
dx0A
dxT
=
0, so that the rst derivative of the plainti's objective function for xT suciently close
to zero is
0T (xT ) =
8<:+ (1  )
0@  ZA
1   +
vuut4x2T + Z4A(1 )4Z2
A
(1 )2+x
2
T
1A9=; (1  xT )D   (cpT + cdT ):
Hence, limxT&0
0
T (0) = D   (cpT + cdT ), which is positive if and only the condition in
the proposition holds. 
C Proof of Proposition 7
Proposition 6 implies that, under the conditions of this proposition, xT satises (26)
in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium. There may be multiple local maxima which satisfy
(26), but as the objective function is continuous and dierentiable in the set of parameters
given by the conditions of this proposition, it is always possible to nd equilibria that
are continuous in a given, suciently small interval of the parameter space. Hence, it
is always possible to nd an equilibrium such that the comparative statics derived in
this proposition hold. Let us therefore restrict to the impact of marginal changes in
parameters on continuous changes in the solution to the rst-order condition (26).
If cdT + c
p
T increases, then the right-hand side of (26) increases. As the second-order
condition for an interior maximum is satised by assumption, the equilibrium xT will fall
as a result.
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Again due to the second-order condition, the sign of the eect of an increase in cdA+c
p
A
on xT is equal to the sign of the partial derivative of the left-hand side of (26) w.r.t. ZA,
which in turn is equal to the sign of the partial derivative of any function h(x) = x
2
x+A
with A > 0. As h0(x) = x(x+2A)
(x+A)2
> 0, we can conclude that xT is increasing in c
d
A+ c
p
A. 
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